SHIFTS IN GLOBAL POWER AND UN PEACEKEEPING PERFORMANCE: INDIA’S RISE AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT
Do shifts in global power affect the performance of United Nations peacekeeping? While many have studied the impact of rising powers on the global economy, none examine how they impact the structure of the UN’s peacekeeping institutions. By engaging in a multi-level analysis, this article links the ascendance of India with the decreased performance of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). By examining the performance of Indian peacekeepers in Congo before and after India’s ascension to a seat on the Security Council in 2011, the article illustrates the specific mechanisms through which India’s shift on peacekeeping undermined the performance of the mission in North Kivu. Drawing on interviews in Congo and India, the article links India’s machinations within the Security Council over the Libyan intervention to the reduced performance of MONUSCO. Specifically, India’s decision to withdraw military hardware from the mission and to end reforms designed to improve relations between peacekeepers and Congolese civilians undermined its ability to fulfill its primary mandate of civilian protection. The analysis suggests that the once firm boundary between troop-contributing countries and those that pay for missions is increasingly unstable with negative consequences for civilian protection.

INDIA’S ASCENDANCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR AFRICA has produced a substantial body of literature over the past decade.¹ Yet, few attempt to

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analyse how India’s rise impacts local political contexts in Africa, as is more common with studies on China. This article seeks to fill this lacuna. It argues that India’s machinations within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where it completed a two-year term in 2011–2012, negatively impacted the performance of the UN’s peacekeeping force in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter, Congo). Through process tracing, it links India’s behavior on the UNSC, where it has raised several major challenges to the overarching global peacekeeping infrastructure, to the failure of the peacekeeping mission in Congo. As India seeks greater influence at the international level, it will destabilize the boundary between the relatively weak and poor countries that traditionally contribute troops to peacekeeping missions, and the wealthy, powerful permanent members of the UNSC that pay for them, with detrimental effects for peacekeeping performance.

The impact of rising powers on the structure of the international system has generated considerable attention from international relations scholars. Scholars have argued that the rise of China and India poses potentially fundamental challenges. By focusing on how the BRICS countries have impacted the global economy, many have argued that the liberal international order is entering a period of transformation, even as they disagree on what form this transition is likely to take. In joining this debate, this article makes two key advances. First, it shifts the focus away from the role of rising powers on international financial institutions towards an understanding of their impact on other global political organizations that have received less attention, specifically the UN and its peacekeeping components. Second, the article argues that in order to comprehend these shifts, it is insufficient to focus only on events unfolding at the international level. Instead, it deploys a multi-level analysis that links the international to events and debates unfolding both at the national (macro) and the local (micro) levels, emphasizing the interaction between these various levels.

The article first shows how the nationality of peacekeepers is an important factor in determining the performance of peacekeeping operations. While

3. See, for one example, this special issue of *International Affairs* 89, 3 (2013) on ‘Negotiating the rise of new powers’ edited by Amrita Narlikar.
existing literature emphasizes cultural or organizational factors, I argue that foreign policy objectives better account for this variation. To make this argument, I provide an overview of the current structure of international peacekeeping. I then identify a specific mechanism—the reliance of UN peacekeeping missions on the military hardware of donor countries—as providing leverage for India as it attempted to exert greater influence over the mandates of peacekeeping missions, the country’s key ambition. I illustrate the argument by linking debates around the intervention in Libya within the UNSC in 2011–2012 (during India’s term on the council) with the decision by the Indian government to withdraw its helicopters from Congo. The decision to withdraw helicopters had an observable impact on the mission at the local level, increasing the number of civilian casualties and leading it towards a substantive restructuring encapsulated in the development of a novel ‘intervention force’. I conclude by assessing what India’s actions mean for Indian foreign policy as well as the evolving international peacekeeping system. Rather than a peaceful convergence around shared liberal values, I suggest that India’s rise may pose a greater challenge to the prevailing international system than generally recognized, though not without consequences for India’s broader foreign policy objectives in Africa.

Drawing such a conclusion from a single incident raises concerns about whether India’s actions regarding Congo (and South Sudan) were ad hoc or indicative of a deeper transformation, as this article suggests. What the article is able to show is that this incident represented a significant departure from long-standing patterns of behavior regarding India’s role in UN peacekeeping. Since UN peacekeeping missions are rare events and India does not contribute to every mission, there are fewer other (if any) such inflection points that can be compared. Moreover, there have been no new cases of Indian involvement in UN peacekeeping since the incidents described below.

One approach would be to simply dismiss India’s behavior in Congo based on its prior patterns until additional data becomes available. However, as scholars have argued, insisting on a comparative approach is of little use for rare events that may be of great political importance (such as an assassination or a natural disaster).8 Alternately, attempting to situate this case in relation to all peacekeeping operations is likely to ‘…miss much of the substance of the problem, code only simplistic variables, and contain relatively little information…’9

7. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) presents perhaps the closest example to that of the MONUSCO. However, there is little value in comparing it here as the decision to remove helicopters and other important changes described below applied to both the Congo and South Sudan missions.
Process tracing is useful for systematically describing such novel political phenomena. It can identify causal mechanisms as well as generate and assess new hypotheses.\textsuperscript{10} By deploying process tracing, the article identifies a clear causal mechanism that shows how shifts in global power, real or perceived, affect the performance of peacekeepers at the local level. While I cannot prove causality, such an approach can provide ‘valuable benchmarks in an investigation by giving an initial assessment of a hypothesis’.\textsuperscript{11}

Research for this chapter was conducted in North Kivu in March of 2012 (and builds on an earlier visit in 2009) as well as a research trip to New Delhi, India in 2011. During two weeks in Congo, I conducted over 20 interviews with peacekeepers associated with the mission in North Kivu (both civilian and military), members of the UN, especially those affiliated with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), outside observers of the mission drawn from local think tanks and NGOs, as well as Congolese civilians selected using a snowball sampling approach. In New Delhi, interviews were conducted with academics and policy makers knowledgeable about Indian interests in Africa.

National variation and peacekeeping performance

What determines the performance of UN peacekeeping missions? Most studies focus on the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{12} Often the question is: why are some missions more successful than others?\textsuperscript{13} And in others, the question is: are peace agreements more durable when peacekeepers are involved?\textsuperscript{14} For both, the unit of analysis is the overall mission and comparisons limited to between different missions or between countries with missions versus those without. As such, these studies treat peacekeeping troops as essentially interchangeable.\textsuperscript{15}

In contrast, some have sought to distinguish between the performance of various national armies participating in peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{16} These

studies emphasize the impact of divergent cultural norms on the relationship between peacekeepers and local civilians. Though the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) advises governments regarding the training of troops, it leaves the actual training to the national government. Thus, there is wide variation in the training provided to peacekeepers on the basis of their nationality. Combined with their preconceived notions, which are also formed within a national context, troops arrive for participation in UN peacekeeping missions with cultural biases intact. Scholars have shown how such biases may influence the aims, mandates and decision-making processes of specific peacekeeping missions.18

Such organizational approaches move beyond cultural difference to question the ‘operational style’ of troops from different nations, which is distinct from though influenced by cultural norms. By embedding herself with units from distinct national armies, Chiara Ruffa conducted a controlled comparison between different nationalities participating in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. She argues that different nationalities have distinct perceptions of the operating environment that impacted their behavior regarding force protection, civil-military coordination (CIMIC) and other operational activities.19

On the ground, these differences are largely taken for granted by troops and commanders, but at the systemic level, the notion of a unitary ‘UN force’ is still given considerable weight.

These studies demonstrate the importance of national operational styles, yet the mechanisms identified operate at the level of the individual troops. Differences in performance are attributed to cultural norms or institutional training, both of which inhere within the psychology of individual personnel. Thus far, scholars have not explored the connection between the performance of troops on the ground and the position of their country within the evolving global system.20 Put differently, do national level policy objectives affect the performance of peacekeepers abroad? In the next section, I offer a theory for linking the performance of specific UN contingents with the broader foreign policy interests of their nation of origin. Though cultural mismatches and operational styles are important, this article argues that shifts in global power have a larger impact on the performance of peacekeepers.

20. Satish Nambiar, ‘UN peacekeeping and India’s national strategy’ (Speech delivered at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011, Summary prepared by Dr. Sundar M.S.).
Foreign policy and the challenge of staffing and paying for peacekeeping missions

After agreeing to authorize a peacekeeping mission, the UN faces two related challenges: who will pay for the mission and who will contribute troops? Regarding costs, Article 17 of the UN Charter, requires all members of the General Assembly (GA) to pay a share. Yet, while the GA apportions peacekeeping expenses based on a complex formula that takes into consideration relative economic wealth of member countries, the five members of the UNSC are apportioned an additional share on the basis that they have a special responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security. In practice, this creates a tiered system in which permanent members of the UNSC, the so-called P-5, possess disproportionate political influence over peacekeeping operations (i.e. every mission must get the approval of all UNSC members).

Yet while the top ten financial contributors provide approximately 80 percent of the costs of UN missions, they contribute less than 10 percent of the personnel to staff those missions. Though the UN Charter calls for all member states to contribute troops and other resources—since its founding, close to 130 member states have complied—in practice, the majority of personnel are drawn from a much smaller set of countries. As of April 2017, out of the 96,865 uniformed personnel contributed by 124 countries, 41,390 come from six countries, accounting for 43 percent of the total. Though there is some movement, South Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan have remained among the top contributors for decades. Significantly, India’s rising power partners, Brazil and China have increased their contributions over the past five years with China entering the top ten for the first time in May 2015 (currently China is ranked 12th and Brazil 20th) (Table 1).

Why do countries choose to contribute troops? Scholarship suggests states contribute to UN missions due to a mix of motivations and constraints including the size of their military, the amount of concurrent commitments, the risk of casualties, their belief in the UN mission, their relative wealth, and

23. In addition to the specific Indian motivations discussed below, South Asian countries were left with large militaries following the end of colonial rule. Sending troops abroad was one solution to this oversupply and potentially destabilizing internal threat. See C. Raja Mohan, ‘India and international peace operations’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, no. 2013/3 (April 2013).
relatedly, the economic incentives on offer. These studies agree that while other motivations are important, the most common profile of troop contributors are relatively poor countries with large militaries and few concurrent commitments.\(^{26}\) While the economic incentive is essential for understanding the broader universe of cases, it ignores the political forces that may shape the participation of certain countries. Focusing on economic incentives cannot explain the behavior of a rising power like India (or China and Brazil), which as I discuss below, possesses a complex set of political motivations for its participation.

Each national army has the ability to decide what strategies it uses to fulfill the mandate, which troops will be selected and what particular military resources it brings to the operation. Ideally, this is to provide national armies with the autonomy and flexibility they demand while retaining the hierarchical structure of a single mission command. In practice, it leads to large differences in each national contingent’s capacity to fulfill the mandate of the broader mission.\(^{27}\) For example, Transparency International has documented wide variation in the standards different nations use to select troops and notes that these criteria remain opaque. The report suggests that this makes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8,342</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7,648</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7,111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>6,815</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2,837</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2,753</td>
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troops from certain countries less effective and more likely to engage in corruption. 28 Specific mission headquarters will occasionally seek to assert their authority by issuing tactical protocols meant to guide the behavior of all national armies, such as directives regarding the deployment of specific weapons or vehicles during patrols. However, national contingents frequently ignore these protocols or comply in creative ways with no real threat of sanction from a relatively powerless HQ. 29

The coordination problem involved in relying on national armies to participate in multi-national coalitions paid for by a different set of countries provides opportunities to national governments to advance their own agendas through their contributions to different missions. The mechanism that countries use to link their foreign policy objectives with the performance of peacekeeping missions is the military resources they bring to the field. In order to ensure that a mission has adequate resources, the UN often must rely on individual countries to provide the appropriate military hardware. There are two main ways in which the UN acquires hardware and supplies for missions. First, the UN owns and maintains some amount of military hardware itself (United Nations Owned Equipment or UNOE). Second, under a memorandum of understanding that provides compensation to the national army, a contingent may supply its own equipment (Contingent Owned Equipment or COE) that may be maintained by the UN or the contingent itself. Specialized equipment that cannot be supplied commercially may be contracted from specific national armies through a Letter of Assist (LOA). Military helicopters and naval vessels to move troops are usually provided this way, for example. It is this category that provides certain countries with leverage over the success or failure of specific missions as countries with specialized resources can offer or withhold such resources with important effects on the viability of certain missions.

The process has been criticized for its lack of transparency and for allowing specific countries to manipulate the system to their own advantage. Most troop-contributing countries (TCCs) do not possess the necessary military hardware to manipulate the LOA system, thereby empowering those that do even further. For example, Peru was criticized for signing an LOA to provide one helicopter to the UN mission in East Timor. The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services determined that due to bid-rigging, the mission was overcharged by $8 million. 30 This example demonstrates the vulnerability of the LOA process to corruption; but as I discuss below, the system can also be manipulated by countries in pursuit of broader foreign policy objectives. I illustrate this by examining the provision of Indian helicopters to African peacekeeping missions.

Indian involvement in African peacekeeping

As part of its efforts to build stronger ties with African countries, India has reaffirmed its commitment to peacekeeping over the past decade. In the views of many, the capacity of Indian military contingents makes them important to any African peacekeeping effort.31 Though the country participates in a variety of missions across Africa, the Congo case is significant as it is the most high-profile of India’s deployments abroad and represents India’s largest investment in a peacekeeping operation thus far.

India has long had multiple reasons for its participation in African peacekeeping. During the cold war, the country’s primary concern was to bolster the UN as a neutral institution through which the countries of the Third World could claim equity.32 Involvement in peacekeeping missions was also a way to improve the capacity of the Indian military and to secure lucrative mission reimbursements. The end of the cold war transformed India’s stance on peacekeeping. As the country’s economy grew rapidly earning it increased respect at the international level, it has sought to leverage its rising influence to rectify perceived imbalances in its participation in global institutions generally and UN peacekeeping specifically. For example, the country has long complained about the relative paucity of high-level appointments for its nationals within DPKO and the lack of transparency involved in the selection process.33 More broadly, India has sought a permanent seat on the UNSC, which would provide it with the capacity to shape peacekeeping mandates.

The country first became involved with peacekeeping during the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953, though its role was limited to providing medical support. India also played a minor role in resolving the crisis over the Suez Canal in 1956. Its first major involvement in a peacekeeping operation was during the UN Operation in Congo from 1960 to 1964. The Congo operation was the first intervention into a domestic conflict rather than the inter-state wars that defined peacekeeping through most of the cold war. India deployed a large contingent including an air force bomber detachment and took heavy casualties losing 39 men.34

By 2009, over 100,000 Indians had served in 43 operations around the world with 130 killed during their deployments. The country touts its record of contributing to missions across Africa including in Angola, Mozambique,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, and more recently, Congo and Sudan/South Sudan. Currently, India is the second largest contributor of troops with over 7,600 personnel deployed operating in eight of the sixteen UN peacekeeping operations globally with the bulk concentrated in South Sudan (2,398) and Congo (3,680).35 In many of these cases, including Congo and South Sudan currently, India is the largest troop contributor. India’s total number of troops represents more than double the amount of peacekeepers deployed by the five permanent members of the UNSC.36

Positions abroad are highly sought after by Indian officers and troops. According to officers interviewed in Goma, positions in peacekeeping missions provide an opportunity to gain field experience that is valued highly upon their return. Every year, 15,000 troops are selected for a first interview with 5,000 eventually deployed to various missions following a ‘pre-induction training’ at the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in New Delhi. Most troops, the vast majority of which are men, have little awareness of Africa prior to departure. They receive a series of briefings in New Delhi where they learn the background of the mission, the activities of Indian troops, and a general history of the country to which they are assigned. Once in country, life is often difficult for the troops, who work six days a week, and are prohibited from socializing with the local population due to DPKO restrictions. Troops interviewed in North Kivu suggested that it was ‘not an easy life over here,’ while complaining that the ‘UN is never concerned about the working life of peacekeepers – he’s like a slave.’37

Despite the mixed performance of many missions with large Indian contributions, the country does possess several unique competencies in relation to its peacekeeping efforts. In addition to its history of peacekeeping and the fact that officers know English, the country also possesses the capacity to provide troops accustomed to operating in a diverse array of terrain. This is generally credited to the extensive number of operations the military engages in domestically, often in terrains comparable to African conflict zones.38

Most importantly, unlike other leading TCCs such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, India possesses ‘standalone capability’ to support a peacekeeping operation on its own. Such a capability is the product of a national army possessing the appropriate military hardware necessary to provision a mission without having to rely on supplies from other countries or the UN. India’s

37. Interview with anonymous MONUSCO troops, Goma, DRC, 7 March 2012.
history as one of the leading arms buyers – since 2012, the largest in the world\textsuperscript{39} – means that the Indian army remains among the best stocked globally. It also means that Indian troops are familiar with state-of-the-art equipment including a wide variety of weapons and systems supplied by all the major arms producing countries such as the United States, United Kingdom and importantly, Russia (due to the lack of interoperability between Russian and US systems).

\textit{Indian performance in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)}

Over the past decade, India has contributed between 3,500 and 5,000 troops at a time to the Congolese mission(s). In this section, I provide background on India’s involvement in MONUC prior to its ascension to a seat on the UNSC. Though the mission faced considerable criticism, beginning in 2008 it implemented a series of reforms that improved its performance, only to abandon these once India moved on to the council in 2011. This had consequential effects for Congolese civilians. As we will see, the decision to abandon the reforms did not result from cultural or operational issues, but rather from India’s decision to leverage its participation in African peacekeeping to pursue its larger foreign policy goals.

MONUC was initiated in 1999 when the UNSC authorized a peacekeeping mission with 500 military observers to monitor the shaky Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Recognizing the inadequacy of the initial authorization, in February 2000, the council approved a relatively small mission of 5,537 troops. By July of 2007, it had ballooned to over 22,000 uniformed personnel drawn from over 60 countries at an annual cost of over US$ 1 billion per year, the largest military force in the history of peacekeeping operations (for 2016–2017, the mission budget is just under US$ 1.3 billion).\textsuperscript{40} Yet, Congo’s population means that only one soldier is responsible for every 1,100 civilians. Put in geographic terms, this means that each UN soldier is responsible for patrolling 12 square kilometers of territory in North Kivu.\textsuperscript{41} In July of 2010, MONUC changed its name to the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect a perceived shift from a conflict to a post-conflict context.

Headquartered in Goma with multiple bases throughout North Kivu, India has been central to the Congolese mission as it is the only TCC willing

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and able to provide air support and other advanced military gear. In 2003, under terms outlined in a LOA, the country deployed the Indian Aviation Contingent (IAC-1) to North Kivu, a unit that included four Mi-25s (1 squadron), a Russian-built attack helicopter, and five Mi-17 transport helicopters (1 squadron) split between bases in Goma and Bunia. This gave the Indian peacekeepers the ability to patrol remote parts of Congo, as well as to provide air support against combatants that frequently resorted to guerrilla tactics to undercut the mission’s ground forces.

The performance of Indian troops in Congo has involved a number of setbacks over the first decade of the mission followed by a brief, yet noticeable, improvement beginning in late 2008. Prior to 2008, Indian contingents and MONUC in general weathered a variety of criticisms related to their performance from Congolese as well as international observers. Foremost was the inability of the mission to carry out its primary mandate of civilian protection. In addition, the mission was accused of corruption, sexual misconduct, and favoritism towards the various anti-government militias operating in the region. Indian peacekeepers were accused of extensive involvement in the region’s illicit trade in natural resources, especially gold.

A preliminary investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services in February of 2008 listed 44 allegations of misbehavior between late 2005 and October 2007, with investigators collecting substantial evidence on at least ten. Among these were accusations of gold smuggling, sexual trafficking and abuse of local women, information sharing and weapons trading with non-state militias, unlawful detention of Congolese citizens and the illicit use of equipment and resources. While other national contingents were accused of misbehavior, Indian troops, due to the scope of the country’s involvement, received the bulk of criticism. A number of reasons were offered for these failures, ranging from the complexity of the mandate to the relatively small size of the force. Despite the lack of formal prosecutions, MONUC came in for harsh criticism from national and international sources, much to the chagrin of Indian officials who felt the country was being unfairly vilified for the failure of the mission. A low point was reached when Congolese civilians, encouraged by local politicians, pelted rocks at all four MONUC bases

42. Lynch, ‘India’s withdrawal’.
44. Human Rights Watch, ‘UN: Tackle wrongdoing’.
45. Lynch, ‘India’s withdrawal’.
in Goma in 2008.\textsuperscript{46} One such attack north of Goma critically wounded an Indian officer.

The nadir for India was reached in November 2008 following a series of events that led to numerous civilian casualties in 24 hours, less than half a mile away from a MONUC base in the town of Kiwanja, in what is now known as the ‘Kiwanja Massacre’. The disaster had its origins when fighting recommenced three months earlier in August 2008 between the forces of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) led by Laurent Nkunda and the national army, known as the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), despite a ceasefire agreement signed in January 2008. The FARDC launched an offensive, but was overwhelmed by CNDP forces with the rebels quickly capturing the towns of Rutshuru (and its smaller neighbor Kiwanja) and Masisi.

On 4 November 2008, a group of Mai Mai soldiers, nativist militias suspicious of the CNDP’s pro-Tutsi bent, launched a surprise attack on Kiwanja.\textsuperscript{47} Numbering over 200 strong, the Mai Mai assault was initially able to briefly retake the town. The next morning, the CNDP counter-attacked and by 2 pm had regained control. Members of the CNDP under the command of its military chief, Bosco Ntaganda, then went door to door in Kiwanja looking for young men who they accused of collaborating with the Mai Mai. Many were summarily executed. Older men and women were also killed and a large number of women were sexually assaulted. Seeking refuge, many civilians fled to the local MONUC base staffed with about 120 troops, but peacekeepers instead focused on ‘assuring the security of humanitarian workers, a foreign journalist, and a group of military observers, rather than protecting the civilian population’.\textsuperscript{48} By the time it was over, about 150 people lay dead.

The mission did face a number of operational challenges. Only about a third of the mission, or 6,000 troops, were based in North Kivu as compared to the 10,000 strong CNDP force. In addition, Nkunda’s reliance on hit and run tactics had a significant impact on MONUC forces, which were dispersed widely through the territory and hence incapable of responding.\textsuperscript{49} In Kiwanja, Indian troops were manning the base when the attack took place, but had begun rotating out to be replaced by a Uruguayan contingent. As a result, during this period, Indian troops had limited access to a single

\begin{itemize}
  \item[47.] Mai Mai are officially independent of the national army, but are often deployed by it to do the ‘dirty work’ against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (referred to as the FDLR, its French acronym) in the words of one high ranking MONUSCO civilian officer (See also Faul, ‘Congo’s conflict’).
  \item[48.] Faul ‘Congo’s conflict’, p. 2.
  \item[49.] Faul ‘Congo’s conflict’.
\end{itemize}
interpreter speaking French and Kiswahili, North Kivu’s lingua franca. Due to the rotation of contingents the base also lacked military intelligence or even the capacity to analyse what intelligence they did possess.\textsuperscript{50} There was a shortage of equipment and troops and confusing commands emanating from mission HQ in Goma. According to the Indian commander of the base, Lt. Col. H.S. Brar, the mission’s complex mandate of protecting civilians while also disarming rebel fighters and policing buffer zones separating insurgents from Congolese troops hindered its ability to fulfill its obligations.\textsuperscript{51} Finally, MONUC’s attention was focused on protecting the provincial capital, Goma, with its large expatriate population, not Rutshuru or Kiwanja.

Yet, the condemnation of MONUC’s performance was widespread, especially after it was revealed that most of the contingent remained unaware of the massacre taking place outside until it was over.\textsuperscript{52} A Human Rights Watch report blamed MONUC for relying too heavily on the Congolese army – with which it was required to engage in joint operations – to fulfill its primary mandate of civilian protection.\textsuperscript{53} Indian troops took the bulk of the blame and the Indian government chafed at the criticism, especially considering the casualties suffered by the contingent due to the fighting.

The response to the Kiwanja massacre demonstrates important disconnections between policies pursued at the local, national and international levels. At the macro/national level, in November 2008, the Congolese government asked Indian troops to leave, only reconsidering in response to US diplomatic prodding in early 2009. At the international/systemic level, India first threatened to cancel new deployments due to the negative coverage of both the Kiwanja massacre and the sex abuse scandals.\textsuperscript{54}

But at the micro/local level, the Indian contingent in North Kivu implemented a number of reforms that substantively improved the performance of peacekeepers earning accolades as a model for other peacekeeping missions. Civilian and military personnel working together in Goma quickly identified the overarching problem as being related to the mission’s unclear focus on the protection of civilians. While civilian protection was confirmed by various mandates issued by the UNSC, there was no specific strategy in place for how this should be accomplished.\textsuperscript{55} Instead, civilian protection

\textsuperscript{50} Human Rights Watch, ‘Killings in Kiwanja: The UN’s inability to protect civilians,’ (2008), p. 22.


\textsuperscript{52} Wambua, ‘Revisiting DR Congo’.

\textsuperscript{53} Human Rights Watch, ‘Killings in Kiwanja’.


\textsuperscript{55} Interview with Guebre Selassie.
was subsumed by a variety of other confusing mandates emanating from different sites.

The central issues identified during the evaluation process focused on the poor relations between troops and local civilians, including the ‘information vacuum’ that characterized relations between the peacekeepers and local communities; the lack of mechanisms for civilians to report abuses directly to the military command; the inability of populations to organize to protect themselves; and the lack of civilians to work within the base to network and ensure communications with the local community. In addition, a number of military challenges were identified such as the lack of appropriate weaponry, including all-terrain vehicles to traverse the difficult road network in North Kivu; a shortage of armoured vehicles to offset the insurgents’ ability to use heavy weaponry; insufficient night-flying equipment for the helicopters; confusing directions from the head office in Goma that required the base in Kiwanja to divert resources to alternate agendas beyond the prime mandate of civilian protection; and constrictive rules of engagement that required MONUC troops to announce their presence with verbal warnings and shots fired in the air prior to engaging the rebels, hence denying the mission the element of surprise.

To rectify these shortcomings, a number of changes were made that either rejuvenated existing DPKO practices or sought to devise new approaches. Working together, the civilian and military teams introduced a number of reforms including the creation of Joint Protection Teams that brought together various UN military and police personnel with MONUC Civil Affairs, Human Rights, and Child Protection staff operating from within the mission’s forward military bases; Early Warning Systems in which the Indian contingent distributed mobile phones to civilians to alert peacekeepers to disturbances; Community Alert Networks which provided a way for local civilians to contact the base via a basic closed cellular network 24-hours a day; Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), which empowered existing Congolese translators to serve as the eyes and ears of the mission by operating within the community to gather information, a MONUC innovation; and a renewed focus on Quick Impact Projects (‘QIPS’) —outreach campaigns in which the bases organized games, vocational training, and provided other gifts to local communities with money provided by the mission.

56. Interview with Guebre Selassie; see also Polgreen, ‘A massacre in Congo’.
In addition, Indian and South African contingents in North Kivu attempted to broaden their presence in the province by employing Standing Combat Deployments (SCDs), in which approximately 30–35 troops are temporarily deployed to vulnerable towns without UN bases with the goal of stabilizing the situation, restoring civilian confidence, and providing a sense of security. The mission also began utilizing additional foot patrols, including night patrols, in order to foster more direct connections with local communities. Numerous informants in Goma praised the Indian contingent for doing more of this than contingents from other countries.

The mission also adopted a more decentralized structure allowing commanders to make decisions outside of their strict military remit. This was important as the behavior of individual peacekeepers on the ground is often determined by the initiatives of their specific commander. By empowering commanders to engage in locally targeted actions that could generate goodwill, the mission sought to alleviate the perception that peacekeepers were too sympathetic to renegade militias. The reform process was bolstered by UNSC Resolution 1856 of 22 December 2008, which renewed MONUC’s mandate for an additional year and called for the mission to attach the highest priority to the protection of civilians, a first for UN peacekeeping.

Though it is difficult to offer a comprehensive assessment of the perceptions of civilians living in North Kivu, at the international level, the reforms were widely praised. For example, the 2009 United Nations Peace Operations Year in Review touted the reforms, going as far as suggesting that they could lead to a ‘phased troop drawdown’ of MONUC forces in 2010. As the civilian head of the mission proudly explained, ‘It was born here, initiated here, piloted here and now it is the best practices of DPKO’. She was not alone in this assessment. An anonymous DPKO consultant who was preparing a comparative study of ongoing peacekeeping missions suggested that after the reforms, ‘Every village has the perception that the contingent is on their side,’ and that the mission had become a ‘standard setter’ for DPKO. Outside of the UN system, Aloys Tegera of the independent Pole Institute told me that the reforms helped the mission ‘to freeze the conflict situation’. A report produced by the International Peace Institute highlighted these reforms concluding that ‘peacekeepers in eastern DRC are indisputably

62. Interview with Guebre Selassie.
63. Interview with anonymous MONUSCO civilian official, Goma, DRC, 7 March 2012.
64. Interview with Aloys Tegera, Goma, DRC, 7 March 2012.
saving lives,’ even as it called for greater attention to strengthening state institutions. Refugees International called for greater UN support for the mission and suggested that as a result of the reforms, ‘MONUSCO is at the forefront of innovative tactics to protect civilians’. 

Security Council politics and the neutering of local peacekeeping initiative

Despite the improvement in performance in 2009 and 2010, the story of Indian peacekeeping in North Kivu province took a turn for the worse soon after. According to one close observer of the mission, at the ‘end of 2011 and beginning 2012, all the good practices developed previously were abandoned by MONUSCO’. As a result, there were a number of setbacks including most threateningly the rise of the March 23 (M23) insurgency under the command of the CNDP’s Bosco Ntaganda in early 2012. After the initial success of the reforms, why did the mission abandon them so quickly?

In the aftermath of the Kiwanja massacre, the reforms enacted by MONUC empowered commanders to determine their own distinct approach to community relations. At the micro/local level, commanders were able to garner a degree of influence over how the operation fulfills its mandate, thereby bringing about performance improvements. Yet, while empowering local commanders is increasingly recognized as a method for improving peacekeeping performance on the ground, peacekeeping remains an essentially political pursuit, one defined by the interests of states at the international level. In other words, national and international agendas will trump local initiatives. As India assumed its seat on the UNSC, it sought to assert its rising power status by manipulating its contributions to UN peacekeeping.

In 2011, soon after India began its term, the Libyan intervention set the stage for a standoff that led the government to leverage its contributions to African peacekeeping missions with consequences for the mission in North Kivu. After days of strained negotiations, ten members including the United Kingdom, France and the United States, the so-called P-3, voted in favor of a UN intervention, while five others, including India, Brazil, Germany and two permanent members, China and Russia, abstained. On 17 March 2011,

67. Of course, attacks against civilians in North Kivu occurred during this period, most starkly the mass rapes of civilians by FDLR troops near the town of Luvungi. Though the precise events remains contested, reports suggest that the nearby Indian-staffed UN base had yet to implement many of the key reforms including increasing the number of translators and deploying CLAs. See Laura Heaton, ‘What happened in Luvungi? On rape and truth in Congo’, Foreign Policy 199 (2013).
68. Interview with anonymous DPKO Consultant, Goma, DRC, 9 March 2012.
the UNSC passed resolution 1973 establishing a no-fly zone in Libya and authorizing the use of force for the protection of civilians.

The actual conduct of the Libya campaign incensed the abstaining council members. Once the campaign began, it became clear that the P-3 countries, which possess the power to draft UNSC resolutions (short of a veto by China or Russia), were pushing for regime change, a position the abstainers felt superseded the boundaries of the mandate itself. Though helpless to stop the intervention once it had begun, the Libyan war triggered a debate about one of the central questions driving peacekeeping missions in the contemporary period, the meaning and practice of the emerging international norm regarding a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 70

The debate around the Libyan intervention raised a number of concerns for India. Specifically, was India’s participation in peacekeeping missions merely advancing the agenda of the P-3? Or was it in line with its foreign policy values and objectives, which were evolving to centre India’s ambition as a rising power over its historic leadership of a declining Third Worldism? As one leading Indian foreign policy figure suggested, R2P is perceived by many developing countries ‘as yet another attempt by the more powerful members of the developed world to impose their value systems on the weaker states’. 71 For India, blindly supporting R2P through its contributions to peacekeeping missions while allowing the P-3 to retain control over defining peacekeeping mandates produced a deep sense of unease. As the Indian Permanent Representative to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, put it referencing the Libya debate, ‘The principle of R2P is being selectively used to promote national interest rather than protect civilians’. 72

The basic tension for India is its role in contributing troops to missions – mostly undertaken without the country playing a direct role in devising the mandate – and its historic support for the centrality of sovereignty in the current international order, particularly when it is perceived as being abrogated by more powerful states. During the cold war, reflecting its limited strength as a middling global power, India could participate in peacekeeping on the basis of being a good citizen within the global community. Support for peacekeeping operations even helped bolster India’s claim to non-alignment and its emphasis on the UN as a politically neutral space for the Third World.


71. Satish Nambiar, ‘Robust peacekeeping operations, rapid deployment capability of the UN: An Indian perspective’ (The United Service Institution of India, New Delhi 2012).

But the end of the cold war and the politicization of the humanitarian discourse means that India can no longer participate in ‘neutral’ interventions without contradicting many of its long-standing foreign policy positions, including respect for state sovereignty, the independence and territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and last resort to the use of force.73 More importantly, un-critically supporting positions advocated by the P-3 is perceived as being detrimental to India’s broader foreign policy goals, especially as they relate to African countries.

In reaction to the Libyan intervention, India crafted a multi-level response. At the national level, the country sought to remain committed to its professed goals by retaining bilateral ties to the Qaddafi regime even after it was clear that the Western powers were intent on its removal. For example, a Libyan delegation was invited to attend the second Africa-India Forum Summit held in Addis Ababa in May 2011.74

At the international level, the Indians pursued a distinct strategy. Specifically, they sought to leverage the country’s capacity to deploy aerial power, a key component of the missions in Sudan and Congo, to push for a greater voice within the UNSC around peacekeeping missions.75 Towards this end, as the debate around Libya and R2P raged, India began threatening to withdraw its four remaining Mi-35 helicopters from MONUSCO (as well as helicopters delegated to the United Nations Mission in Sudan) when its LOA expired on 4 July 2011, unless TCCs were given a greater say in designing future peacekeeping missions, much to the chagrin of the P-3. One close observer of the UNSC noted that the debate was the ‘most acrimonious’ she had ever witnessed.76

With few exceptions, notably South Africa and Ukraine, no other TCC has the capacity or the will to provide helicopters for extended periods, hence making the Indian threat a substantive one.77 The government claimed that it faced a domestic need for the helicopters to fight its internal Maoist insurgency – a position bolstered by a damning Comptroller and Auditor General report that suggested that operational shortages faced by the Indian Army in its battle with domestic insurgents were directly linked to its participation in UN missions. Yet some perceived it as a power play by India to assert more

73. K. Kumar, ‘India’s past year at the UN Security Council’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA Comment, 7 February 2012.
75. For a full discussion of Indian involvement in Sudan, see Zachariah Mampilly, ‘Peacekeeping and the Arab World: India’s rise and its impact on UN Missions in Sudan’, in Kareem Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (eds), Land of the Blue Helmets: The UN in the Arab World (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2016).
76. Interview with Kirsten Hagan, OXFAM, Goma, DRC, 6 March 2012.
77. Interview with Hagan; see also Lynch 2011a.
influence over the direction of future peacekeeping mandates. Leading voices have long called for leveraging India’s contributions to peacekeeping in order to ‘insist on adequate representation at the UN Headquarters and on decision-making mechanisms there’. India’s Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Manjeev Singh Puri, also spoke openly about the need for ‘more consultation’ with key TCCs directly linking the provision of helicopters to the debate around the mandates of peacekeeping missions.

During India’s term as President, the UNSC was set to host an ‘Open Debate on Peacekeeping’ at the country’s urging, rendering its threat far more resonant. In addition, both Brazil and South Africa, India’s rising power allies through groupings such as IBSA and BRICS, were also rotating members of the council with similar misgivings about the Libyan intervention. With the IBSA countries in agreement, both China and Russia would feel compelled to agree. Prior to the debate in August, India circulated a memo entitled, ‘Peacekeeping: taking stock and preparing for the future’. In the memo, India highlighted the importance of host government consent and R2P’s implications for state sovereignty, calling for peacekeeping missions to be treated as a ‘partnership’ between the UNSC, the General Assembly and the TCCs, rather than the preserve of the P-3. In addition, in a nod to the withering criticism it faced following the Kiwanja massacre, the memo repeated India’s long-standing concern that peacekeeping mandates continued to underestimate the resources necessary with TCCs bearing the bulk of the blame when missions failed.

Effects on peacekeeping in Congo

The effect of this debate at the local level was to weaken the capacity of the Indian contingent, and hence the overall missions in Congo (and Sudan). Stung by a non-committal response from the P-3 to its reform initiatives, the

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79. Nambiar, ‘Robust peacekeeping operations’.
82. For more on Indian relations with Brazil over R2P, see Zachariah Mampilly, ‘Indian peacekeeping’.
83. Interview with Hagan.
Indian government reduced its material support for the Congo mission while undercutting the capacity of commanders on the ground to have operational control over the mission. The newly appointed MONUSCO Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash, began to withdraw support for foot patrols and other reforms designed to increase interaction between peacekeepers and civilians in late 2010. In line with India’s complaints about the mismatch between mandates and resources, Prakash put forth the official Indian position that resource shortages undermined the capacity of the mission to adequately fulfill its mandate of civilian protection. This was despite the fact that most of the reforms instigated by Indian commanders in North Kivu did not require additional financial outlays.

Most importantly, despite agreeing to return its helicopters to North Kivu, the Indian government decided to replace the 8 Mi-25/35 attack helicopters and 9 Mi-17 transport helicopters deployed to the missions in Congo and Sudan with six light utility helicopters manufactured in India (Chetak and Cheetah). Beyond the net reduction in number, the Indian made helicopters have less military capacity than the Russian made Mi and can only undertake surveillance, observation, search and rescue, medical and reconnaissance missions. By late 2011, the situation became so dire that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon drafted a letter to the UNSC warning that the lack of helicopters made the situation ‘critical’ and calling for members to ‘think outside the box’ to cover the shortfall. Ukraine offered four Mi-24 attack helicopters in March 2012 and South Africa provided some transport helicopters to cover the shortfall, but neither was willing to make the long-term commitment necessary to retain MONUSCO’s aerial advantage.

In March 2012, a group of ex-CNDP soldiers loyal to Bosco Ntaganda mutinied from the Congolese Army. Claiming that that the government had failed to implement the 23 March 2009 peace agreement with the CNDP, the group adopted the moniker M23 for itself. Despite possessing significantly less military power than its predecessor, M23 quickly took control of large territories in North Kivu, including the towns of Bunagana on the Ugandan border and marching on to Rutshuru and Rugari despite the

85. Interview with anonymous human rights worker, Goma, DRC, 8 March 2012.
87. Pragmatic Euphony 2011.
88. Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Letter dated 20 September 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, S/2011/589, 2011. The letter states that the lack of helicopters had the following consequences: ‘Joint operations with the Congolese Armed Forces have had to be postponed, investigations of allegations of mass human rights violations have had to be delayed, and some deployments to protection hot-spots have had to be deferred. Getting essential supplies to United Nations troops in far-flung, volatile areas has also been extremely difficult.’
presence of an Indian contingent at the Kiwanja base.\textsuperscript{89} M23’s advance led to a massive humanitarian crisis. Both the rebels and government forces were accused of war crimes, including the summary executions of civilians, mass rapes, and forced recruitment including children, leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands.\textsuperscript{90}

The above evidence suggests that in its confrontation with M23, MONUSCO was hindered by the Indian decision to pull its helicopters and equally importantly, to cancel the reforms that improved relations between the mission and civilians. As the International Crisis Group noted, the failure to prevent M23’s rise was related to the ‘militarily passive’ behavior of MONUSCO and demonstrated the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the mission.\textsuperscript{91} Relations with Congolese civilians also declined and both local and national political leaders criticized the mission’s performance, a dramatic turnaround from the praise showered on it following the post-Kiwanja reforms.\textsuperscript{92}

In July 2012, following the recapture of several towns by joint FARDC/MONUSCO teams, a ceasefire was agreed between M23 and the Congolese government. Yet fighting continued intermittently, leading the UN to announce the creation of a 3,000-strong ‘Intervention Brigade’ with the explicit intention of strengthening MONUSCO’s offensive abilities for a limited period of time.\textsuperscript{93} In a first for a UN peacekeeping mission, the brigade, staffed primarily with contributors from other African nations, was empowered to carry out targeted offensive operations against armed groups and successfully routed the forces of M23 in November 2013. But despite its success, the intervention brigade was never designed as a long-term solution. And four years later, eastern Congo remains a zone of violence.

\textit{Conclusion}

By tracing the performance of peacekeeping missions before and after India’s ascension to the UNSC, this article demonstrates how changes in the distribution of global power may affect peacekeeping performance. The on-going transformation of the international system is likely to have lasting impacts on the performance of future peacekeeping initiatives. Failing to consider the political motivations of troop-contributing countries inhibits our

\textsuperscript{89} According to the International Crisis Group, M23 had less than a fifth of the number of troops at its disposal as did the CNDP, though substantive rumors of Ugandan and Rwandan military involvement compensate for this weakness. International Crisis Group, ‘Eastern Congo: Why stabilisation failed’, Africa Briefing N°91, 4 October 2012, pp. 11.
\textsuperscript{92} Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: M23 rebels’, p.11.
understanding of the determinants of peacekeeping success or failure. The rise of the BRICS countries in particular may require the P-3 to cede some control over the design of peacekeeping mandates, a position it is unlikely to accept. As India’s decision to withdraw its helicopters to protest the Libyan intervention demonstrates, the prior division between TCCs and those that pay for the missions in which the former cede any influence over the design of peacekeeping mandates is no longer stable. Increasingly, India and other rising powers not only demand a say in devising the mandates of peacekeeping operations, but also have the leverage to affect the performance of missions, for better or worse.

Scholars that focus on the integration of rising powers into existing global arrangements generally conclude that the value of incorporation will trump any desire to break away completely. In other words, due to economic and political factors, they will be ‘conservative’ rather than ‘radical reformers’. Though several voices challenge this consensus, India is often singled out as a constructive partner rather than a direct challenger to the existing international order. But an examination of India’s behavior regarding peacekeeping raises doubts about whether this narrative will prevail. Focusing on peacekeeping provides a fuller picture of the challenges to the prevailing international order that will continue to arise as India, as well as other rising powers, demand a greater say in the decision making of international organizations.

There are also implications for Indian foreign policy. Historically, Indian contributions to peacekeeping were praised as an integral demonstration of its support for the UN and the broader liberal order as well as serving to generate goodwill among African countries and beyond. For example, India’s contributions have been recognized as an important argument in favor of granting the country a permanent seat on the UNSC. African countries have consistently supported India’s ambitions. Even former US President Barack Obama cited the country’s involvement in peacekeeping as a key reason for his support.

Yet, by utilizing peacekeeping to compete with established powers, the country undercuts the ability of UN missions to fulfill their mandates. The victory of the Hindu nationalist BJP party in the 2014 national elections is likely to increase the politicization of India’s role in African peacekeeping. The party calls for a muscular foreign policy in line with its belief that India deserves to be treated equally to other recognized powers, making it suspicious of extraneous peacekeeping commitments. Combined with the recent calls by the Trump administration to reduce United States support for the

94. Kahler, ‘Rising powers’.
95. E.g. Narlikar, ‘India rising’.
Congo mission, the net impact is likely to be increased suffering for Congolese civilians. The key lesson from India’s behavior in Congo is that the performance of peacekeeping missions, particularly in relation to civilian protection, is likely to be undermined when both rising and established powers treat peacekeeping only as a battleground through which to exert influence over the evolution of the international system. For India, continuing to do so may undermine its own historic practice of using peacekeeping to generate goodwill in African countries, instead promoting animosity due to its weak performance on the ground.